The Price-Anderson Act: A Constitutional Meltdown of Tort Liability by Brauer, Berndt Ingo
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 8
Number 2 Winter 1981 Article 5
1-1-1981
The Price-Anderson Act: A Constitutional
Meltdown of Tort Liability
Berndt Ingo Brauer
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Berndt Ingo Brauer, The Price-Anderson Act: A Constitutional Meltdown of Tort Liability, 8 Hastings Const. L.Q. 371 (1981).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol8/iss2/5
The Price-Anderson Act: A
Constitutional Meltdown of TortLiability?
By Berndt Ingo Brauer*
In the wake of recent events at Three Mile Island, public con-
cern about the safety of nuclear power has risen dramatically.
Nonetheless, many members of government and industry are look-
ing to the nuclear generation of electricity as the most promising
prospect for meeting the nation's energy needs.' Currently, seventy
nuclear reactors are in operation, eighty-five are under construc-
tion, and another eleven are in the planning stage.2 As the number
of reactors increases so does their kilowatt capacity.' As a result, a
nationwide debate has developed regarding the environmental
risks created by the nuclear generation of power.'
Opponents of nuclear power suggest several scenarios in which
radioactive materials known as fission products could threaten
public safety. It is possible that released radioactive wastes could
contaminate hundreds of acres of land for thousands of years. Or
an earthquake could rupture a reactor core, releasing deadly fission
products. Mechanical failure, human error or even sabotage could
cause a reactor to drastically overheat. In the worst possible case
the intense heat could melt the protective structure enclosing the
nuclear material, causing the reactor core to contaminate the sur-
rounding area. This is known as a "meltdown." Failure of an emer-
gency cooling system could also result in such a meltdown.
Studies have estimated that, should a meltdown occur,
thousands of lives could be lost and property damage could
* B.A., 1976, U.C.L.A.; J.D., 1980, Hastings College of the Law, University of Califor-
nia. Member, California Bar.
1. See, e.g., Bethe, The Necessity of Fission Power, 234 SCIENTIFIC AM. 21 (Jan. 1976);
Address by T. Nemzek, Director, Division of Reactor Research and Development, U.S. En-
ergy Research and Development Administration, to the International Platform Ass'n (Aug.
6, 1975) ("Nuclear Power-Myth and Reality").
2. NRC, PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT, NUREG-0380 (1980).
3. JOINT COMM. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., SELECTED MATERIALS ON IN-
DEMNITY AND INSURANCE LEGISLATION 56 (Joint Comm. Print 1974).
4. See ENVIRONMENTAL EDUC. GROUP, A PUBLIC REPORT ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
(1974); R. NADER, THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY (1977); S. NOVICK, THE CARELESS ATOM
(1969).
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amount to billions of dollars.' In spite of the enormity of these
figures the Price-Anderson Act6 insulates operators of nuclear
power plants and certain other persons associated with the re-
search, production or utilization of nuclear power from liability by
limiting recoverable damages for a nuclear accident to $660 mil-
lion.7 In a recent case, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc.,S the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the limited liability provisions of the Price-An-
derson Act.
This note will examine the correctness of the Supreme Court's
conclusion that the Act conforms with the Constitution. Specifi-
cally, the constitutional issues to be discussed are: (1) whether the
Act violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment on the
ground that the amount of recovery is not rationally related to the
potential losses; (2) whether the Act violates the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment on the ground that the Act
unreasonably places a greater burden upon those people living near
nuclear reactors than upon people living far away; and (3) whether
the Price-Anderson Act can be differentiated from constitutionally
valid statutory schemes limiting liability such as automobile guest
statutes, worker's compensation acts and the Swine Flu Act. In
conclusion, it will be suggested that since alternatives are available
to the Act's limited liability provisions, a different analysis of the
constitutionality of the Act's recovery ceiling would have been
more appropriate.
I. Estimated Consequences of a Nuclear Incident
Although $660 million may appear to be a substantial sum to
the average individual, damage resulting from a single nuclear inci-
dent could easily exceed this amount. If a reactor core were to ac-
cumulate heat sufficient to melt its surrounding steel walls and
rupture the concrete containment building in which it is housed,
5. AEC, THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN LARGE
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, WASH-740, at 14 (1957) [hereinafter cited as WASH-740]; NRC,
REACTOR SAFETY STUDY, WASH-1400, app. VI, at 70 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WASH-
1400].
6. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014,
2039, 2073, 2210, 2232, 2239 (1978 & Supp. 1980)).
7. This sum is comprised of the $500 million indemnity provided for under the Act as
well as the $160 million protection that each licensed nuclear reactor with a rated capacity
of 100,000 kilowatts or more is required to maintain in private insurance. See 42 U.S.C. §
2210(e)(1978 & Supp. 1980); 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4)(1980); note 62 infra.
8. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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large amounts of radioactivity could escape into the atmosphere.'
Several government studies estimating the consequences of a re-
lease of radioactivity have concluded that the resulting damage to
the public could exceed the Act's liability ceiling.10
In 1957, the Brookhaven Report 1 attempted to predict the
consequences of a reactor core meltdown. It based its predictions
upon a 500,000 kilowatt reactor (which is one fifth the size of most
existing reactors) located 30 miles from a major city.1 2 The report
concluded that a meltdown could result in 3,400 deaths, 43,000
acute injuries, and $7 billion in property damage. s "Depending
upon the weather conditions and temperature of the released
fission products," the report stated, "the areas affected could range
from about 18 square miles to about 150,000 square miles.' 4
Another study conducted at the same time as the Brookhaven
Report attempted to estimate the worst possible damage a specific
reactor could produce. 15 According to this report, if the 300,000 kil-
owatt Enrico Fermi plant in Lagoona Beach, Michigan, was to ex-
perience a core meltdown, and a release of 50% of its fission prod-
ucts, with weather conditions carrying radioactivity to the most
heavily populated areas of Detroit, 133,000 deaths, 181,000 imme-
diate injuries and 245,000 long-term injuries could result.'6
In 1965, the Brookhaven Report was updated by the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC)17 to take into account the increased
size of later model reactors. The study concluded that a meltdown
could cause 45,000 deaths, 100,000 injuries, $17 billion to $280 bil-
lion in property damage and long term contamination of an area
the size of Pennsylvania. 8
9. WASH-1400, supra note 5, at 6.
10. See note 5 supra.
11. WASH-740, supra note 5.
12. Id. at 25.
13. Id. at 14.
14. Id.
15. AEC, A REPORT ON THE PossEBL EFFECTS ON THE SURROUNDING POPULATION OF AN
ASSUMED RELEASE OP FISSION PRODUCTS INTO THE ATMOSPHERE FROM A 300 MEGAWATr Nu-
CLEAR REACTOR LOCATED AT LAGOONA BEACH, MICHIGAN, APDA-120 (1957).
16. Id. Immediate injuries are defined as radiation injuries occurring within one year
of exposure. Long-term injuries refer to injuries occurring more than one year after expo-
sure. See S. NOVICK, THE CARELESS AToM 163-64 (1969).
17. AEC, Papers on Update of WASH-740, at 59-9, 136-3 (1964) (unpublished papers
on file at the NRC Public Documents Room, Washington, D.C., released June 25, 1973),
cited in Note, Nuclear Power and the Price-Anderson Act: Promotion over Public Protec-
tion, 30 STAN. L. REv. 393, 431 n.179 (1978).
18. Denenberg, Nuclear Power: Uninsurable, 38 PRoGRESSIVE 27, 28 (1974). It should
be noted that the 1964 update was kept secret for eight years. As a result of a lawsuit filed
Winter 1981]
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In 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued its
best known reactor safety study-the Rasmussen Report.19 This
study described several situations that could lead to a reactor core
meltdown. A failure in the normal reactor cooling system accompa-
nied by a failure of the emergency core cooling system could lead
to dangerous overheating.20 Any number of other conditions, in-
cluding failures in the shutdown and decay heat removal systems,
could result in a meltdown.21 The report estimated that, in the
most adverse weather conditions, an accident arising out of a core
meltdown could result in 3,300 prompt fatalities, $14 billion in
property damage, and the contamination of 3,200 square miles of
land.22
The Rasmussen Report, which is the most recent probability
and damage report, estimated the likelihood of a core meltdown to
be one in twenty-thousand per reactor per year.2" Based upon one
hundred operating reactors, the number anticipated to be in opera-
tion in the United States by 1990,24 this means that the annual
likelihood of a meltdown is one in two hundred. The report also
indicated a positive correlation between amount of damage and de-
gree of improbability of a core meltdown. According to the study,
"[tihe core melt accident having a likelihood of one in 20,000 per
reactor per year would most likely cause property damage of less
than $1,000,000. "125 An accident causing damage of $1 billion dol-
lars was estimated to have a probability of one in 1,000,000.26 Fi-
nally, an accident causing $14 billion, which was considered to be
the maximum possible damage, was estimated to have a
probability of about one in 1,000,000,000 per reactor per year.27
under the Freedom of Information Act, the study was made public in 1973. Id. at 29.
19. WASH-1400, supra note 5.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 83-85 (statistics based on one in a billion chance per reactor year). The
Reactor Safety Study has been criticized for underestimating the delayed cancer fatalities
by a factor of 35-50, delayed thyroid injuries by a factor of 0-12, inherited disorders by a
factor of 10-65 and property damage by a factor of 5-10. See American Physical Society
Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, Report to the American Physical Society, 47
REVS. MoD. PHysics S106 (1975) (Supp. No. 1). See also Nuclear Agency Revokes Support
for Safety Study, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
23. WASH-1400, supra note 5, at 8.
24. This is according to a statement made by James G. Hanchett, Public Affairs Of-
ficer, NRC Region V, on Jan. 2, 1981. See also NRC PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT, NUREG-
0380 (1980).
25. WASH-1400, supra note 5, at 11.
26. Id.
27. Id. At this point, it should be noted that the NRC has recently withdrawn most of
its support from the Rasmussen Report. Nuclear Agency Revokes Support for Safety
[Vol. 8:371
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Actual nuclear accidents have occurred, although none, luck-
ily, have produced damage of the magnitude estimated in the NRC
studies. Nonetheless, a review of recent reactor mishaps helps put
into perspective the liability limitations of the Price-Anderson Act.
In Chalk River, Ontario, on December 12, 1952, a sudden genera-
tion of heat caused uranium rods in a reactor core to fuse, filling
both the air and the surrounding cooling water with radioactive
fission products.28 On November 29, 1955, in Idaho Falls, Idaho, a
core meltdown occurred during an experiment at the Experimental
Breeder Reactor. 9 In that case, a misunderstanding between a sci-
entist and an operator resulted in the melting of the fuel ele-
ments.30 Fortunately, no personal injuries were reported.31 On Oc-
tober 10, 1957, the Number-One Pile Reactor in Windscale,
England, malfunctioned, causing radioactive contamination of milk
and vegetables3 2 and requiring the government to seize all growing
food in a 400 square mile area around the plant."
In 1965, a fire at the AEC's Rocky Flats plant exposed 400
workers to high concentrations of plutonium; 25 workers were ex-
posed to up to 17 times the permissible level.3 4 As noted by the
Public Report on Nuclear Power Plants,3 5 "In one 18-month pe-
riod, there were 24 fires, explosions, plutonium spills and contami-
nation incidents. Some 325 workers have been contaminated by
the radiation since 1953. Fifty-six workers got cancer; 14 have
died."s
On January 10, 1967, a water valve failure was responsible for
radioactive contamination of the laundry of a fuel reprocessing
plant located at West Valley, New York.37 Of the two laundry
Study, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1979, at 1, col. 2. Specifically, the NRC announced that it
"'does not regard as reliable the Reactor Safety Study's numerical estimate of the overall
risk of a reactor accident.'" Id. Therefore, the Commission concluded, the absolute
probability of a risk presented by the Rasmussen Report "'should not be used uncriti-
cally'" either in making regulatory decisions or for purposes of making policy decisions. Id.
at 19.
28. ENVIRONMENTAL EDuc. GROUP, supra note 4, at 32.
29. AEC, OPERATIONAL AccmES AND RADIATION EXPOSURE EXPERIENCE 31 (1968).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. ENVIRONMENTAL EDUC. GROUP, supra note 4, at 30. Due to the high radioactivity in
the Irish Sea, embryo fish displayed deformed backbones. Id. See generally ROYAL COMMIS-
SION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, NUCLEAR POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT 59 (1976).
33. ENVIRONMENTAL EDuc. GROUP, supra note 4, at 30.
34. Id. at 31.
35. ENVIRONMENTAL EDUc. GROUP, supra note 4.
36. Id. at 31.
37. Severo, "Was soil man mit dem Zeug tun?" DER SPIEGEL, May 9, 1977, at 215.
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workers who were exposed to radiation, one developed a bone dis-
ease and the other died of lung cancer in 1972.38 On March 22,
1975, at the Browns Ferry Reactor in Alabama, a major cooling
failure was caused by a fire started by a workman using a candle to
inspect cables.39 A core meltdown was prevented only because a
pump, not designed for the purpose, was able to keep cold water
flowing through the reactor core for several hours.0
More recently, on March 28, 1979, the main feedwater system
at the Three Mile Island nuclear generating plant malfunctioned.41
An auxiliary feedwater system which should have started automat-
ically failed because a number of its manual valves had inadver-
tently been left closed.42 Without a feedwater supply, both the
coolant termperature and the pressure inside the core rose, trigger-
ing a relief valve at the top of a pressurized tank.43 It is estimated
that approximately two hours after the initial malfunction, two-
thirds of the twelve-foot high core stood uncovered.44 This resulted
in a continuous release of low level radiation through the ventila-
tion system of the plant.4 5 It is significant to note that, according
to a report on the incident, if the relief valve had remained open
another thirty to sixty minutes, "a substantial portion of the fuel
in the core .. .would have melted. ' '46 Although neither Three
Mile Island nor any other accident has yet 'occurred in this country
which exceeded the $660 million mark, the possibility does exist
that such an accident could occur in the future.47
In this connection, it should be noted that a very serious nu-
clear accident occurred in the Soviet Union in 1957. A Central In-
telligence Agency report48 about the accident stated the following:
In about 1956 there was an explosion at Chelyabinsk-40; the ex-
plosion lighted up the sky for a great distance and the newspa-
pers in Chelyabinsk made a flimsy attempt to proclaim the event
an unusual occurrence of the northern lights. The chief evidence
38. Id.
39. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Fire: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic
Energy, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1975).
40. R. WEBB, THE ACCIDENT HAZARDS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 198-99 (1978). See
also Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Fire, supra note 39.
41. See SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP, NRC, THREE MILE ISLAND: A REPORT TO THE COMMIS-
SIONERS AND THE PUBLIC 14-15 (1980).
42. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, REPORT 94 (1979).
43. Id. at 94-96.
44. Id. at 100.
45. See SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP, supra note 41, at 25.
46. Id. at 20.
47. See generally 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4)(1980); note 62 infra.
48. Z. MEDVEDEV, NUCLEAR DISASTER IN THE URALS 195 (1979).
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of the explosion was the tremendous number of casualties in the
hospitals of Chelyabinsk. Many of the casualties were suffering
from the effects of radiation.49
According to Russian scientist Zhores Medvedev, the explosion oc-
curred at an underground nuclear waste disposal site between Che-
lyabinsk and Tscheljabinsk and resulted in several thousand
deaths and in the contamination of tens of thousands of
inhabitants.50
II. Legislative History
None of the nuclear accidents to date have resulted in liability
for injuries or property losses in excess of $660 million.51 However,
49. CIA, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT No. OOK-323/20537-76 (Sept.
20, 1976), reprinted in Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 48, at 195.
50. Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 48, at 166. See also Zehntausende Wurden Verseucht,
DER SPIEGEL, Apr. 9, 1979, at 42-46.
According to one CIA Report: "In spring 1958, he heard from several people that large
areas north of Chelyabinsk were contaminated by radioactive waste from a nuclear plant
operating at an unknown site near Kyshtym, a town 70 kilometers northwest of Chelyabinsk
on the Chelyabinsk-Sverdlovsk railroad line. It was general knowledge that the Chelyabinsk
area had an abnormally high number of cancer cases. To go swimming in the numerous
lakes and rivers in the vicinity was considered a health hazard by some people. Food
brought by the peasants to the Chelyabinsk market (rynok) was checked by the municipal
health authorities in a small house at the market entrance where the peasants also paid
their sales tax. How radioactive food was destroyed was unknown to source. Food delivered
to the plants, schools, etc., by the kolkhozy and sovkhozy was probably examined by the
latter themselves. Until 1958 passengers were checked at the Kyshtym railway station, and
nobody could enter the town without a special permit. By what authority the permit was
issued and why the checking was discontinued in 1958, source was unable to say. In addi-
tion, some villages in the Kyshtym area had been contaminated and burned down, and the
inhabitants moved into new ones built by the government. They were allowed to take with
them only the clothes in which they were dressed." CIA, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMA-
TION REPORT No. CSK-3/465, 141 (Feb. 16, 1961), reprinted in Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 48,
at 187.
According to another CIA Report. "In the winter of 1957, an unspecified accident oc-
curred at the Kasli ... atomic plant ... All stores in Komensk-Uraskiy which sold milk,
meat, and other foodstuffs were closed as a precaution against radiation exposure, and new
supplies were brought in two days later by train and truck." CIA, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION REPORT No. CS-3/389, 785 (March 4, 1959), reprinted in Z. MEDVEDEV, supra
note 48, at 185.
"The only detail SOURCE could learn of the plant itself was that a 'tube' protruded
from the surface of a nearby lake. Area was tightly guarded by military personnel. Plant
employees lived in a settlement within the restricted area, which they were not allowed to
leave and which no unauthorized person could enter. In 1959, a female worker who died was
buried within the area; relatives were denied entry." CIA, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMA-
TION REPORT No. CSK-3/465, 141 (Feb. 16, 1961), reprinted in Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 48,
at 189.
51. It is also significant to note that according to the General Public Utilities Corpora-
Winter 19811 THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
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it is clear that accidents do occur and that the scientific studies
estimating possible loss from a serious accident conclude that ac-
tual damage could well exceed the liability ceiling of the Price-An-
derson Act.
In light of clear evidence that damage from a nuclear disaster
could exceed $1 billion, the background and purpose of the Price-
Anderson recovery limitations must be examined. Congress ini-
tially gave the federal government a monopoly in the field of nu-
clear technology with the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of
1946.52 However, in order to encourage private industry to partici-
pate in the development of nuclear energy, Congress subsequently
enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 53
Subsequent to passage of the 1954 Act, congressional hearings
were held by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to discuss,
among other things, the exceedingly high amount of damages faced
by private industry in the event of a nuclear accident. 4 Potentially
catastrophic liability was considered to be a deterrent to private
industrial participation in the development of nuclear energy.5 In-
dustry's concern over the possibility of unlimited liability was ex-
emplified by the testimony of Charles H. Weaver, vice president of
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, in which he asserted
that Westinghouse could find itself "absolutely liable to the pub-
lic should damage occur. Obviously, we cannot risk the financial
stability of our company for a relatively small project no matter
how important it is to the country's reactor development effort, if
it could result in major liability in relation to our assets."56
Referring to negotiations for the purchase of component parts for
the nuclear reactor, Mr. Weaver testified:
Our supplier was unwilling to go ahead with the contract unless
we agreed to indemnify him against nuclear risks ... [I]n order
to get the supplier to go ahead with the work, we had to promise
him to resolve the indemnity problem before delivery of the
tion, operator of the Three Mile Island reactor, the cost of decontaminating the badly dam-
aged reactor will amount to approximately $1 billion. Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 1980, at 3, col. 4.
52. Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 735 (superseded 1954). See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 1803 (1957).
53. Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1970
& Supp. 1975)).
54. See Governmental Indemnity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against
Reactor Hazards: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1956) [hereinafter cited as 1956 Indemnity Hearings]. See also Three Mile Island Utility
Lobbying Hard for Bailout, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 19, 1980, at 5, col. 4-5.
55. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 1803 (1957).
56. 1956 Indemnity Hearings, supra note 54, at 110.
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equipment, or, in the alternative, reimburse him for his costs.
This is an example of the immediacy of the problem.57
Although the Joint Committee regarded the risk, of a serious
accident as extremely remote,58 there was considerable reluctance
on the part of its members and on the part of industry spokesmen
to estimate the potential damage. However, an "off the record" es-
timate of $5 billion was mentioned by the committee's chairman
Clinton Anderson .5
It was against this background that the Joint Committee rec-
ommended that the deterrent of enormous liability be removed by
making available a public fund from which liability claims could be
satisfied. 0 In response, Senator Anderson introduced Senate Bill
715 on January 3, 1957. This bill provided that "[t]he amount of
financial protection required [of a licensee] shall not exceed the
amount of liability insurance available from private sources."" l In
addition, the bill provided that "[t]he aggregate liability for a sim-
ple nuclear incident of persons indemnified shall not exceed the
sum of $500,000,000 together with the amount of financial protec-
tion required and any other sums whch may be made available by
the Congress as additional indemnification."82 Representative Mel-
vin Price introduced the identical bill in the House on January 5,
1957." These bills, known as the Price-Anderson Act, became law
57. Id. at 116.
58. Id. at 158.
59. Id.
60. See generally id.
61. S. 715, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 170 (1957).
62. Id. It should be noted that 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4) provides that each licensed
nuclear reactor which has a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts or more is required to
maintain financial protection in an amount equal to $160 million.
"(a) Each licensee is required to have and maintain financial protection:
"(1) In the amount of $1,000,000 for each nuclear reactor he is authorized to operate at
a thermal power level not exceeding ten kilowatts;
"(2) In the amount of $1,500,000 for each nuclear reactor he is authorized to operate at
a thermal power level in excess of ten kilowatts but not in excess of one megawatt;
"(3) In the amount of $2,500,000 for each nuclear reactor other than a testing reactor or
a reactor licensed under section 104b of the Act which he is authorized to operate at a
thermal power level exceeding one megawatt but not in excess of ten megawatts; and
"(4) In an amount equal to the sum of $160,000,000 and the amount available as secon-
dary financial protection (in the form of private liability insurance available under an indus-
try retrospective rating plan providing for deferred premium charges) for each nuclear reac-
tor which is licensed to operate and which is designed for the production of electrical energy
and has a rated capacity of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more: Provided, however, That
under such a plan for deferred premium charged for each nuclear reactor which is licensed
to operate, no more than $5 million with respect to any nuclear incident and no more than
$10 million within one calendar year shall be charged."
63. H.R. 1981, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 170 (1957).
Winter 19811
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on September 2, 1957, without floor debate in either house. 4
III. Limited Liability Provisions
As a condition for obtaining a license65 and construction per-
mit,6 the Price-Anderson Act requires that the licensee (the util-
ity) provide and maintain private financial protection67 in an
amount determined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission68 and
enter into an indemnification agreement with the NRC. In perti-
nent part, the Act provides:
The aggregate liability for a single nuclear incident of persons in-
demnified, including the reasonable costs of investigating and set-
tling claims and defending suits for damage, shall not exceed (1)
the sum of $500,000,000 together with the amount of financial
protection required of the licensee or contractor or (2) if the
amount of financial protection required of the licensee exceeds
$60,000,000, such aggregate liability shall not exceed the sum of
$560,000,000 or the amount of financial protection required of the
licensee, whichever amount is greater: Provided, That in the
event of a nuclear incident involving damages in excess of that
amount of aggregate liability, the Congress will thoroughly review
the particular incident and will take whatever action is deemed
necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the conse-
quences of a disaster of such magnitude.6 9
This section can be divided into four basic components. First,
the Act requires NRC licensees to furnish financial protection in
the form of insurance in amounts determined by the Commission.
Second, it requires the Commission to provide indemnification of
up to $500 million for each nuclear incident. Third, the Act limits
liability for a nuclear incident to the aggregate of the Commission's
indemnity and the amount of private insurance required. Finally,
by a 1975 Amendment, the Act authorizes Congress, in the event of
64. See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1803 (1957).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (1978).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2235 (1978).
67. "The term 'financial protection' means the ability to respond in damages for pub-
lic liability and to meet the costs of investigating and defending claims and settling suits for
such damages." 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (K)(1978).
68. 42 U.S.C. 8 2210(a)(1978). It should be noted that the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 8§ 5801-5891 (1977 & Supp. 1980) abolished the AEC, 42 U.S.C. § 5814
(1977), and replaced it with the Energy Research and Development Administration, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5811-5820 (1977 & Supp. 1980) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
42 U.S.C. §§ 5814-5849 (1977 & Supp. 1980). Under 42 U.S.C. § 5842, the NRC assumed the
AEC's former licensing and regulatory functions.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(1978).
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a nuclear incident resulting in damage in excess of the aggregate
liability limit, to "review" the incident and to take "whatever ac-
tion is deemed necessary and appropriate. '70
Beyond these fundamental provisions, the Price-Anderson Act
establishes other limits on liability. One provision exempts nuclear
power plants with a capacity of less than 100,000 kilowatts from
the $660 million financial protection provision.71 These plants are
required to maintain "the maximum amount [of liability insur-
ance] available at reasonable cost and on reasonable terms from
private sources. '72
The Act also extends its limited liability provisions to certain
government contractors and nonprofit and educational institutions
engaged in the construction of nuclear facilities. 3 Under the 1975
Amendments,74 the NRC may agree to indemnify its contractors
for up to $500 million and may further require its contractors to
provide a private source of financial protection "in such amounts
as the Commission may determine to be appropriate to cover pub-
lic liability. . . . "5 Nonprofit educational institutions, on the other
hand, are exempted from the requirement that private financial
protection be obtained.7 6 The Act thus provides for an aggregate
indemnity, in such cases, in an amount not to exceed $500 million
for damages resulting from any one nuclear incident.77
70. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1978). It should be noted that only four plants have low
enough kilowatt ratings to escape this provision. See Electricity from Nuclear Power,
ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM 9-14 (1977).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1978). According to the NRC, $140,000,000 is presently the
maximum amount of liability insurance "available at reasonable cost" from private sources.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d)(1978) (government contractors); 42 U.S.C. § 2210(k) (1978)
(nonprofit and educational instructors).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1978).
75. Id. As defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w)(1978), "public liability" means any legal
liability arising out of a nuclear incident except certain claims such as state or federal
worker's compensation claims.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(k)(1978).
77. Id. In contrast to the limitations on liability for damages resulting from a nuclear
incident in the private sector, section 2211 of the Public Health and Welfare Code states
that "[I]t is the policy of the United States that it will pay claims ... [for damages] ...
proven to have resulted from a nuclear incident involving the nuclear reactor of a United
States warship." 42 U.S.C. § 2211 (1978). Thus, while the private side of nuclear industry is
protected from full liability for damages, the public side, at least insofar as warships are
concerned, bears full liability for the inescapable risks. While the Act has undergone several
amendments, the original limited liability provision has remained unchanged. 42 U.S.C. §
2210(c)(1978).
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IV. Constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act
The constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act has been
ruled upon in two federal cases: Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission8 and
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. 79 In
the former case a federal district court held certain sectionss° of
the Price-Anderson Act to be unconstitutional as violating the due
process and equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment.
The district court held that the challenged sections of the Price-
Anderson Act violated the due process clause by allowing "the de-
struction of the property or the lives of those affected by nuclear
catastrophe without reasonable certainty that the victims will be
justly compensated."8' The court gave three reasons for this con-
clusion. First, since damage to life and property resulting from a
nuclear accident could easily exceed the limit on liability, "[t]he
amount of recovery is not rationally related to the potential
losses."82 Second, the "low ceiling. . . placed on accountability to
the public [tends] to diminish rather than to heighten steps neces-
sary to protect the public and the environment."83 Finally, the
court noted the lack of benefits accruing to those who lived near a
nuclear plant when measured against the potential burdens.8 4
The district court also held that the Act violated the equal
protection provision included in the due process clause of the Fifth
78. 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
79. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(c), 2210(e)(1978).
81. 431 F. Supp. at 222.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 223.
84. Id. at 223-24. The court gave several reasons supporting the conclusion that there
is no quid pro quo. First, the court reasoned that since the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher,
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (which held the owner of a dam liable for the property damage
sustained by downstream land owners when the dam burst) applies to those who engage in
ultrahazardous activities, operators of nuclear reactors do not confer a benefit to potential
plaintiffs when the operators waive defenses of negligence, contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk. 431 F. Supp. at 223. A second reason is that, in contrast to an airline
passenger who in theory has an option to travel or stay at home, the neighbor of a nuclear
reactor has no such option to accept or reject the risks of contamination. Id. at 224. Third,
the court stated, "[p]rompt release of funds without prolonged litigation is not afforded.
The Act promotes uncertainty rather than certainty and delay rather than promptness in
the settlement of claims." Id. (emphasis in original). Fourth, there is no quid pro quo be-
cause, unlike claims under workmen's compensation and the Warsaw Convention, claims
under the Price-Anderson Act "[bear] more relationship to the number of people injured
than to the severity of the injury." Id. Finally, the court noted that the limitation of the
Price-Anderson Act is absolute and applies to companies even though a nuclear catastrophe
may be the result of "willful [mis]conduct or gross negligence." Id.
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Amendment85 "because [the Act] provides for what Congress
deemed to be a benefit to the whole society (the encouragement of
the generation of nuclear power), but places the cost of that bene-
fit on an arbitrarily chosen segment of society, those injured by
nuclear catastrophe." 8 The Price-Anderson Act, as viewed by the
court, "irrationally places the risk of [a] major nuclear accident
upon people who happen to live in the areas which may be touched
by radioactive debris. '87 Additionally, the court noted that the
statute "unreasonably places a greater burden upon people dam-
aged by nuclear accident than upon people damaged by other
types of accidents, such as motor vehicle or electrical accidents,
involving power companies." '88 Moreover, the court reasoned that
the Act violated equal protection since "[it] unreasonably and irra-
tionally relieves the owners of power plants of financial responsi-
bility for nuclear accidents and places that loss upon the people
injured .. .who are .. .least able to stand such losses." 89 The
court concluded that alternatives to a liability ceiling rendered
those provisions of the Act "unnecessary to serve any legitimate
public purpose." 90
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court reversed the dis-
trict court and upheld the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson
Act91 on both due process92 and equal protection grounds.9 3
85. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Court in Bolling stated that
"[though] the Fifth Amendment ... does not [expressly] contain an equal protection clause
as does the Fourteenth Amendment.. .the concepts of equal protection and due process,
both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." Id. at 499.
86. 431 F. Supp. at 224-25.
87. Id. at 224.
88. Id.
89. The court suggested two alternatives. First, it suggested the establishment of a
liability pool requiring contributions in advance. The court stated that "[tihis would effec-
tively place the responsibility upon the group most directly profiting from any improvement
in the costs or usefulness of electric power-the power company stockholders and the cus-
tomers.... ." 431 F. Supp. at 224. It appears that this would also mean abandoning the
Act's indemnification provisions. The second alternative the court suggested is to "make
[nuclear] accidents a national loss and to pay those damaged out of the federal treasury."
Id. The advantage of this proposal is that it "would spread the loss among those who
benefitted indirectly by having the nation's power supply increased as well as among those
who presumably benefitted directly." Id.
90. Id.
91. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
92. Id. at 82-93.
93. Id. at 93.
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A. The Due Process Clause
First, addressing the due process challenge, the Court found
that since the Act's legislative purpose was to "stimulate the pri-
vate development. . . of nuclear power. . . the liability limitation
...emerges as a classic example of an economic regulation...
which come[s] to the Court with a presumption of constitutional-
ity."94 The burden of establishing this limitation as irrational or
arbitrary, therefore, falls on the party complaining of a due process
violation. The then-existing $560 million liability limitation is
neither irrational nor violative of due process, the Court continued,
since "expert appraisals. . .[indicate that there is an] exceedingly
small risk of a nuclear incident involving claims in excess of $560
million." '5 The Court's opinion also indicated that Congress would
enact "extraordinary relief provisions" in the event of a nuclear
*disaster resulting in claims in excess of $560 million. Further-
more, since the choice of a liability figure would inevitably be
based upon imponderables, "[w]hatever ceiling figure is selected
will, of necessity, be arbitrary. 9 7 Finally, the Court stated that
since "nothing in the liability-limitation provision undermines or
alters in any respect the rigor and integrity of [the licensing pro-
cess], the District Court's. . .conclusion that the Price-Anderson
Act 'tends to encourage irresponsibility. . . on the part of builders
and owners' of the nuclear power plants, simply cannot withstand
careful scrutiny."98 The Court noted that in the event of a serious
94. Id. at 83. The Court cited Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
Usery arose under Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 which
required, among other things, that operators of coal mines compensate former employees
who terminated their work before the Act was passed. 30 U.S.C. § 411(c)(3)-(4)(1979). In
holding that the Act does not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Supreme Court stated: "It is now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens
and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and
that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legis-
lature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way." 428 U.S. at 15.
95. 438 U.S. at 85-86. The Court based this conclusion on S. REP. No. 94-454, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975), which states that "the probabilities of a nuclear incident are
much lower and the likely consequences much less severe than has been thought previ-
ously." 438 U.S. at 86 n.30. In contrast, the EPA and the Union of Concerned Scientists
have stated that the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), notes 5 & 22 supra, underesti-
mated the consequences of a nuclear incident.
96. 438 U.S. at 85. The Court relied on H.R. REP. No. 89-883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7
(1965) which stated that "in the event of a national disaster,. . . it is obvious that Congress
would have to review the problem and take appropriate action." Moreover, "[tihe limitation
of liability serves primarily as a device for facilitating further congressional review ...
rather than as an ultimate bar to further relief of the public." 438 U.S. at 86.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 87 (citation omitted).
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accident the utility itself would risk bankruptcy, or at least great
amounts of damage, and that such risk is in itself no small incen-
tive to avoid the kind of irresponsible and cavalier conduct implic-
itly attributed to the utility by the district court. Moreover, the
Court stressed that the Act provides a "fair and reasonable substi-
tute for the uncertain recovery of damages of this magnitude from
a utility or component manufacturer, whose resources might well
be exhausted at an early stage."' 9
The Court further rejected the district court's conclusion that
the Act failed to maintain a quid pro quo.100 The Court did not
determine whether the due process clause requires that a legisla-
tively enacted compensation system "either duplicate the recovery
at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy"'10 since
the Price-Anderson Act was held to provide a "reasonably just sub-
stitute for the common-law or state tort law remedies it
replaces.' °
B. The Equal Protection Provision
The Supreme Court also held that the Act's liability ceiling
was consistent with the equal protection provision of the Fifth
Amendment.0 3 This conclusion was reached by balancing the com-
peting interests of the importance of nuclear power against the
burden borne by those injured in nuclear accidents.' 0' This balanc-
ing process is apparent in the Court's statement that:
The general rationality of the Price-Anderson Act liability limita-
tions-particularly with reference to the important congressional
purpose of encouraging private participation in the exploitation
of nuclear energy-is ample justification for the difference in
treatment between those injured in nuclear accidents and those
whose injuries are derived from other causes.105
The Court did not engage in any more detailed equal protection
analysis.
V. Constitutional Analysis
In the preceding discussion it was seen that the Supreme
99. Id. at 91.
100. Id. at 87-88.
101. Id. at 88.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 93-94.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Court upheld the Price-Anderson Act on due process grounds for
five reasons: (1) the risk of damage exceeding $560 million is "ex-
ceedingly small";10 (2) if damage were to exceed $560 million,
"Congress would likely enact extraordinary relief provisions; 10 7 (3)
any liability ceiling figure would of necessity be arbitrary;108 (4) the
"rigor" of the licensing process precludes the possibility that the
Price-Anderson Act might encourage irresponsibility on the part of
builders and owners of nuclear reactors; 0 9 and (5) like other con-
stitutionally valid limitations of liability,110 the Price-Anderson Act
provides a "reasonably just substitute for the common-law . . .
remedies it replaces." '
Each of these five reasons, however, may be effectively rebut-
ted. First, the Court ignored evidence that the report it relied on
for data on nuclear accidents, the Reactor Safety Study,11 2 seri-
ously underestimated the risk of a major nuclear accident. 3 Ac-
cording to the Environmental Protection Agency,"1 the Reactor
Safety Study understated the risk based on underestimated health
effects, evacuation doses, and probabilities of releases of radioac-
tivity in a value between one and several hundred.115 Consistent
with the EPA Report, a study by the Union of Concerned Scien-
tists concluded that the Reactor Safety Study seriously underesti-
mated the probability of a reactor meltdown.116 The NRC has, in
fact, recently withdrawn most of its support of the Reactor Safety
Study.217
A more accurate view of the risks involved may have been pro-
vided in the testimony of nuclear scientist Henry W. Kendall at
106. Id. at 85-86.
107. Id. at 85.
108. Id. at 86.
109. Id. at 87.
110. The Court cited Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929)(automobile guest statute);
Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883)(limitation of vessel owner's
liability); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (Warsaw
Convention limitation of air carrier's liability for injuries suffered during international air
travel). 438 U.S. at 88 n.32
111. Id.
112. See notes 5 & 22 supra.
113. It should be noted that the Court did mention the fact that the Reactor Safety
Study has been criticized. In note 28 of Duke Power Co., the Court stated: "For a thorough
criticism of the Reactor Safety Study, see EPA, Reactor Safety Study (Wash-1400): A Re-
view of the Final Report (June 1976)." 438 U.S. at 85 n.28.
114. EPA, REACTOR SAFrr STUDy (WASH-1400): A REvIEw oF ThE FINAL REPORT,
EPA-520/3-76-009 (1976).
115. Id.
116. See note 140 infra.
117. See note 27 supra.
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the district court trial.118 "There is about one chance in five years
of a meltdown among 100 reactors during the normal life of those
reactors,"'119 Kendall estimated. In particular, Dr. Kendall testified
that since the Reactor Safety Study only covered the first five
years of each reactor's life,12 0 the study did not properly evaluate
the effects of aging and wear and tear.12 1 Furthermore, Dr. Kendall
testified that the study did not adequately consider the chance of
damage precipitated by earthquakes or sabotage and that "only a
few of the possible accident sequences had really been thoroughly
evaluated. 12 2
In light of the apparent shortcomings of the Reactor Safety
Study, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the risk of damage ex-
ceeding the then-existing $560 million figure is "exceedingly
small" 123 rests on a remarkably weak foundation. If the Supreme
Court is correct in assuming that the probability of a major acci-
dent is only one in ten million,' 2' then the Court should not have
hesitated to encourage Congress to assume full responsibility for
the possible consequences of a nuclear accident. As Herbert S.
Denenberg, former Pennsylvania Commissioner of Insurance re-
cently pointed out, "[tihe Price-Anderson Act is continuous proof
that our present nuclear technology is not safe enough to permit
those who control it to be financially responsible for its
consequences. 1 25
Second, the Court's reliance upon the "likelihood" that Con-
gress would enact extraordinary relief provisions 12 in the event of
excessive damage is subject to the criticism that full compensation
is thus made dependent upon merely political factors. By relying
upon congressional action, the Supreme Court has preserved the
uncertainty inherent in the compensation scheme of the Price-An-
derson Act. That full compensation is not always paid to accident
118. Dr. Henry Kendall, Professor of Physics at M.I.T., testified for the plaintiffs at
the district court. 431 F. Supp. at 212.
119. Id. at 213.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Also notable is the fact that the Reactor Safety Study is not signed by any
person and is prefaced by the statement that "[n]either the United States nor the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ... makes any warranty, express or implied, nor assumes
any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy of [the report]." WASH-1400, supra
note 5 (inside cover). This statement seems to indicate the author's desire to discourage
reliance on the accuracy of the report.
123. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
124. WASH-1400, supra note 5, at 83-84, Tables 5-4 & 5-7.
125. Denenberg, supra note 18, at 27.
126. 438 U.S. at 85.
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victims is demonstrated by the experience of victims of the Texas
City Disaster of 1947127 and of the atomic tests in Utah and New
Mexico in the late 1940's. 1 8 If the Court is correct in assuming
that the risk of major damage is "exceedingly small,"' 29 a logical
step would have been to abandon the uncertain compensation
scheme of the Price-Anderson Act.
Third, the Court's statement that any liability ceiling will "of
necessity be arbitrary"130 is a curious justification for the constitu-
tionality of the Act. That the Act's liability ceiling is arbitrary is
precisely the argument raised against the constitutionality of the
Act. While other legislative schemes which limit liability also have
liability ceilings,"3' they do not make the amount of compensation
received by an individual dependent upon the number of plaintiffs
injured as does the Price-Anderson Act.5 2 Moreover, while other
127. "As a result of explosions of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, over 570 persons were
killed and 3,500 injured, and great property losses occurred .... After the Supreme Court
decision in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), which held that the government
was not liable to the victims, Congress enacted the Texas City Disaster Relief Act, 69 Stat.
707 (1961) eight years after the catastrophe. The statute set a limit of $25,000 on awards for
death, personal injuries, or property damage, although many of the victims suffered prop-
erty damages demonstrably in excess of that sum.... Under a 1959 amendment permitting
slightly more liberal payments, it was estimated that up to about $4 million additional
would be paid. These figures contrast sharply with appraisals of the actual damages ranging
from between $60 million and $100 million to about $300 million to 'billions of dollars.'
"...The victims were left substantially or completely uncompensated for a period of
from eight to ten years, and then in many cases received grossly inadequate compensation."
A. ROSENTHAL, H. KORN & S. LUBMAN, CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENTS IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
3-4 (1963).
128. Study Shows High Leukemia Toll in Area of Utah Probably Hit by Nuclear
Fallout, Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1979, at 10, col. 1. It has been reported that residents of the
sparsely populated area which received fallout from atomic bomb tests conducted from 1951
to 1963 in the Nevada desert are noticing an increase in leukemia, birth defects, sterility,
miscarriages and cancer. Segel, Utah Residents File Fallout Suit, HEALTH WATCH, Fall
1980, at 8. See also Fadiman & Jacobson, The Downwind People, LnE, June 1980, at 2. One
study found that the incidence of leukemia in children born between 1951 and 1958 in high
fallout counties in southern Utah was 2.44 times greater than in children born in the same
counties before or since this seven year period. Lyon, Klauber, Gardner & Udall, Childhood
Leukemias Associated With Fallout From Nuclear Testing, NEw ENGLAND JOURNAL OF
MEDicnm, Feb. 22, 1979, at 397-402. Because the government has not provided compensa-
tion for those injured from fallout, 965 claimants from St. George, Utah have recently filed a
$500 million lawsuit against the United States Government charging that the Atomic En-
ergy Commission and the United States Government were negligent in failing to provide
residents with sufficient information about the health dangers of atomic testing. Segel, Utah
Rdsidents File Fallout Suit, HEALTH WATCH, Fall 1980, at 8.
129. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
130. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
131. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(1978).
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legislative schemes which limit liability guarantee a given amount
of compensation, 13 3 the Price-Anderson Act guarantees a given
amount of compensation only in the event of congressional ac-
tion."" It follows that in recognizing that any liability ceiling is
arbitrary, the Court should have taken the next logical step and
declared the Act unconstitutional as a violation of due process of
law.
Fourth, the Court's statement that the "rigor and integrity" of
the licensing process precludes the possibility that the Price-An-
derson Act might encourage irresponsibility on the part of builders
and owners of nuclear reactors13 5 is contradicted by several studies.
In 1973, the AEC conducted a task force study of the reactor
licensing process.136 Not made public until 1974, the study stated
that "there is still an unanswered question as to the quantified de-
gree of safety ... of a nuclear power plant. 1 3 7 The report
continued:
Approximately 850 abnormal occurrences were reported to the
AEC during the 17 month period used as a sample base (January
1, 1972 to May 31, 1973). These abnormal occurrences involved
malfunctions or deficiencies associated with safety related equip-
ment. Forty percent of the occurrences were traceable in some
extent to possible design and/or fabrication related deficiencies.
The primary cause of at least 200 of the component malfunctions
was design and/or fabrication errors. The remaining incidents
were precipitated by operator error, improper maintenance, inad-
equate erection control, administrative deficiencies, random fail-
ure, and variations of the foregoing.3 8
The task force concluded that: "The large number of reactor inci-
dents, coupled with the fact that many of them had real safety
significance,. . . raises a serious question regarding the current re-
view and inspection practices both on the part of the nuclear in-
dustry and the AEC."13'
Similarly, a 1972 study conducted by the Rand Corporation1 40
133. See generally note 110 and accompanying text supra.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(1978).
135. 438 U.S. at 87. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
136. AEC, EVALUATIONS OF INCIDENTS OF PRIMARY COOLANT RELEASE FROM OPERATING
BOILING WATER REACTORS (1972), portions appearing in UNION OF CONCERNED SCIErISTS,
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 112 (1975).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 112-13.
139. Id. at 113.
140. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NucLEAR FuEL CYCLE 113 (1975) (re-
printing portions of Rand Corp. Study).
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reviewed reactor accidents and noted the "increasing reports of
poor quality control and documented carelessness in manufacture,
operation and maintenance of these complex machines. ' '141 Consis-
tent with the Rand Study, the Union of Concerned Scientists con-
cluded in their book, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, that "a reactor acci-
dent with major consequences is a real possibility in the coming
decades."1 2 To be sure, the recent accident at Three Mile Island
came perilously close to an accident with "major consequences." In
light of this evidence it is difficult to see how the "rigor and integ-
rity"14 of the licensing process precludes irresponsibility on the
part of builders and owners of nuclear reactors.
Fifth, the Court's statement that the Price-Anderson Act is
similar to other constitutionally valid limitations of liability is
open to criticism. Although the Court stated that the Act provides
a "reasonably just substitute for the common-law. . . remedies it
replaces,' 44 the Act's liability ceiling is fundamentally dissimilar
to other constitutionally valid limitations of liability.
Automobile guest statutes are a common example of legislated
liability ceilings. Typical legislation of this type prohibits most re-
covery by an individual traveling as a guest in another's motor ve-
hicle."45 The purpose of such a statute is to prevent the "serious
public evil" presented by "many instances of collusion, utter indif-
ference to results because of protective insurance, perjury and con-
sequent fraud upon the courts." 46
In Silver v. Silver,147 the United States Supreme Court held
that a Connecticut guest statute did not violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since the classification
was based upon the desire to prevent the "abuses originating in
the multiplicity of suits growing out of the gratuitous carriage of
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
144. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
145. "[N]o person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle ... as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages
against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such
accident was intentional on the part of such owner or operator, or was caused by his willful
or wanton disregard of the rights of others." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. xxi § 6101(a). This statute
was upheld as being consistent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974). Cf. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506
P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
146. Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97, 99 (Del. 1974).
147. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
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passengers in automobiles.- 148 It is difficult to see how an automo-
bile guest statute provides an analogy for a statute which abso-
lutely limits liability to between $560 million to $660 million. In
contrast to the Price-Anderson Act, a guest statute does not erect
an unconditional barrier for full compensation since it allows for
recovery in accidents caused by "willful or wanton disregard of the
rights of others. 1 49 Also, while a person generally has the option to
decide whether he or she will become a nonpaying automobile pas-
senger, that person does not necessarily have this choice in deter-
mining whether he will expose himself to the risk of radioactive
contamination. Thus, fundamental dissimilarities exist which make
analogization between the Price-Anderson Act and automobile
guest statutes questionable.
Similarly, legislation exempting shipowners from liability for
losses caused by fire "unless such fire is caused by the design or
neglect of such owner or owners"1 50 can be distinguished from the
Price-Anderson Act. For one thing, the provisions of this statute
are far narrower than those comprising the Price-Anderson Act.
Under the "Act to limit the liability of Ship-Owners,"1 51 shipown-
ers remain fully liable for losses caused by their negligence. Under
the Price-Anderson Act, on the other hand, operators of nuclear
reactors are not held fully accountable for accidents caused by
their negligence.1 52 In addition, under the act limiting the liability
of shipowners, the fact that shipowners remain liable to the extent
of the value of their interest in the vessel and the freight then
pending means that there is some relationship between the degree
of liability and the amount of actual loss. In the event of a reactor
148. Id. at 123.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(1978); 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4). See note 62 supra.
150. On March 3, 1851, Congress enacted a statute entitled "An Act to limit the liabil-
ity of Ship-Owners and for other Purposes," Ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851). The first section of
that act provides: "That no owner or owners or any ship or vessel shall be subject or liable
to answer for or make good to any one ... any loss or damage which may happen to any
goods or merchandise whatsoever, which shall be shipped, taken in, or put on board any
such ship or vessel, by reason or by means of any fire happening to or on board the said ship
or vessel, unless such fire is caused by the design or neglect of such owner or owners."
The third section of this act provides: "That the liability of the owner or owners of any
ship or vessel for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by the master, officers, mariners,
passengers, or any other person or persons of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped
S.. or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter or thing, loss
damage, or forfeiture done, occasioned, or incurred without the privity or knowledge of such
owner or owners shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner or
owners respectively in such ship or vessel and her freight then pending."
151. Id.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(1978).
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meltdown and release of a substantial amount of fission products,
it is clear that the degree of liability would bear no such reasonable
relationship to the amount of actual loss. Finally, the practical ef-
fect of the act limiting shipowners' liability is to shift the cost of
insurance from the shipowner to the shipper. Under the Price-An-
derson Act, in contrast, it is impossible for private individuals such
as homeowners to obtain insurance against radioactive
contamination.1 s
The limited liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention1
are similarly distinguishable from the Price-Anderson Act. Under
the Warsaw Convention, the liability of an airline for injury to or
loss of life of each passenger is limited to $75,000.151
In Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Pan Ameri-
can Airways, 56 a United States District Court held that the War-
saw Convention's limitation on liability was not inconsistent with
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment since "[t]he public
policy against contractual limitation of liability by common carri-
ers . must bow to the overriding policy of the treaty.1, 7
Even though $75,000 is not much in today's inflated economy,
the fact that this figure applies to each individual passenger1 58
would appear to provide for a reasonable scheme of compensation.
In the case of the present $660 million liability ceiling under the
Price-Anderson Act,1 59 an accident causing $10 billion in damages
to 40,000 people would result in compensation of only $16,500 per
153. Id. § 3019. See PENNSYLVANIA INSURANCE DEP'T, CITIZEN's BILL OF RIGHTS AND
CONSUMER'S GuIDE To NUCLEAR POWER (1973), reprinted in STAFF OF JoINr COMM. ON
AToMIC ENERGY, 93RD CONG., 2t SESS., SELECTED MATERSIAS ON ATOMIC ENERGY INDEMNITY
AND INSuRANcE LEGISLATION 459 (Comm. Print 1974).
154. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876. See also 49 U.S.C. § 1502
(1970)(notes).
155. Id. On February 13, 1933, the Warsaw Agreement came into force. In pertinent
part it provides: "In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each
passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs .... Nevertheless, by special con-
tract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability." 49 Stat. 3000,
3019 (1929). By special agreement between participating carriers and the Civil Aeronautics
Board, carriers going to or from an agreed stopping place in the United States are subject to
a limit of liability of $75,000 which includes the costs of litigation. See, e.g., 58 F. Supp. 338,
340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). The Court cited Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N.Y.
244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935). The rationale for this provision is that since the carrier can dis-
tribute the loss and obtain insurance to cover it, the loss can be better borne by the carrier
than by the victim.
156. 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
157. Id. at 340.
158. See note 154 supra.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(1978). 10 C.F.R. 3140.11(a)(4)(1980). See note 62 supra.
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person. In the absence of the liability ceiling, the individual pro
rata recovery would be $250,000. If only 20,000 people were injured
as the result of a nuclear accident, the amount of individual com-
pensation would double to $33,000. Thus, the amount of compen-
sation provided for under the Price-Anderson Act is made to de-
pend upon the number of persons injured. The result is that, while
the Warsaw Convention provides for a certain and specific level of
compensation for the individual accident victim, the Price-Ander-
son Act provides for a fixed fund which makes the amount of indi-
vidual compensation depend upon the number of persons injured.
The comparison of the Price-Anderson Act to worker's com-
pensation statutes is similarly flawed. Generally, worker's compen-
sation acts impose liability upon an employer for an employee's
injury or death arising in the course of employment. Such acts re-
quire the employer to provide compensation to the employee or his
family without regard to fault except where the injury is caused
intentionally by the employee. 160 Moreover, the compensation for
disability is fixed according to a graduated scale based upon loss of
earning capacity. 1'
The constitutionality of worker's compensation acts was ad-
dressed by the United States Supreme Court in New York Central
Railroad Co. v. White.'62 There the Court held that a system of
compensation which limits the amount of recovery does not violate
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'6 3 In re-
sponse to the due process argument, the Court stated that al-
though an "employee is no longer able to recover as much as before
in case of being injured through the employer's negligence, he is
entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of injury, and has a
certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty and expense of
establishing negligence in proving the amount of the damages."'"
The equal protection aspects of worker's compensation stat-
utes were recently discussed by the United States Supreme Court
in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.'6 5 Upholding the consti-
tutionality of the Act against an equal protection challenge, the
160. See W. PROSSER, LAW ON ToRTs 530-37 (1971).
161. See, e.g., S. HERMICK, CALIFORNIA WORKM'S COMPENSATION HANDBOOK, 211-31
(1978).
162. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
163. Id. at 204-05.
164. Id. at 201. See also Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) in which the Court
held that the Iowa Compensation Act which establishes a system of compensation according
to a prescribed schedule does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
165. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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Court stated, "[the] workmen's compensation codes represent out-
growths and modifications of our basic tort law . .. [they] re-
moved difficult obstacles to recovery in work-related injuries by of-
fering a more certain, though generally less remunerative,
compensation." 1 6 The test to determine the validity of state stat-
utes under the equal protection clause according to Weber is
whether "a statutory classification bear[s] some rational relation-
ship to a legitimate state purpose. 1 6 7 Application of this "rational
relationship" test in turn necessitates a dual inquiry: "What legiti-
mate state interest does the classification promote? What funda-
mental personal rights might the classification endanger?" 6 8
Although worker's compensation acts and the Price-Anderson
Act both limit liability, several major differences outweigh their
similarities. Under worker's compensation, an accident victim is
compensated for his or her individual loss according to a predeter-
mined schedule. In contrast, under the Price-Anderson Act, com-
pensation to an accident victim is dependent upon the number of
individuals injured. The amount of a worker's compensation pay-
ment, although limited by statute, is nonetheless certain, while
under the Price-Anderson Act the amount of compensation is
uncertain.
Another characteristic of worker's compensation which distin-
guishes it from the Price-Anderson Act is the fact that under
worker's compensation there exists a contractual relationship be-
tween employer and employee. In theory at least, there has been a
bargained-for exchange, or a quid pro quo. In return for giving up
the legal right to sue his or her employer, the employee is guaran-
teed recovery in the event of injury-usually a monthly sum to
compensate for lost earnings. Under the Price-Anderson Act, no
such contractual relationship exists between a utility operating a
nuclear reactor and a potential accident victim.
Another statutory scheme limiting liability is the National
Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976169 (the "Swine Flu
Act"). Under this Act, private providers of the Swine Flu vaccine
are protected from liability for any injury or death suffered by in-
oculated individuals. 70 The Act abolishes all causes of action
166. Id. at 171-72.
167. Id. at 172.
168. Id. at 173.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 247b (1978 & Supp. 1980).
170. The Swine Flu Act applies to three categories of "program participants" which
are defined as (1) manufacturers or distributors of the vaccine; (2) public or private agencies
that provide an inoculation without charge and with informed consent; and (3) medical or
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against private manufacturers, distributors and providers of the
vaccine and makes a tort action against the United States the only
remedy.17 1 Significantly, a cause of action brought against the
United States is not subject to monetary limitations. 17 2
The constitutionality of the Swine Flu Act was upheld by a
United States District Court in Sparks v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc. 73 The court held that insofar as it abolishes a cause of action
against a program participant and substitutes an alternative, effi-
cacious remedy against the United States, "the Swine Flu Act com-
ports with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."' ' Cit-
ing Swanson v. Bates, 75 the Court in Sparks stated: "[n]o one has
a vested right in a given mode of procedure and so long as a sub-
stantial and efficient remedy is provided, due process of law is not
denied by a change of remedy." 7
The Swine Flu Act is easily distinguished from the Price-An-
derson Act. The major difference between the two statutes is that
under the Swine Flu Act the United States assumes full responsi-
bility for injuries caused by the vaccine. Under the Price-Ander-
son Act the United States assumes only partial liability in the form
of the $500 million indemnification provision. 78
It is thus apparent that the Price-Anderson Act is not sub-
stantially analogous to other limitations on liability. The Price-An-
derson Act is unique in making the amount of compensation an
individual can recover dependent upon the total number of acci-
dent victims. This fact may in itself make the relief afforded by
the Act arbitrary and irrational. It appears that the Supreme
Court's real purpose in upholding the Act was to shield the nuclear
power industry from potential bankruptcy.
other health personnel who provide an inoculation without charge and with the informed
consent of the recipient. Id. § 247b(k)(2)(B). The provisions of the Swine Flu Act which are
particularly relevant include: (1) the creation of a cause of action against the United States
for any personal injury or death arising out of the act or omission of a program participant,
Id. § 247b(k)(2)(A); (2) the abolition of a cause of action against program participants by
making the cause of action against the United States the exclusive remedy, Id. § 247b(k)(3);
and (3) the application of the procedures of the Tort Act to actions brought against the
United States. Id. § 247(k)(2)(A).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 431 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
174. Id. at 416.
175. 170 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1948).
176. 431 F. Supp. at 416.
177. See note 170 supra.
178. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
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Conclusion
While the Price-Anderson Act continues to encourage the de-
velopment of nuclear power, the Act fails to achieve its stated ob-
jective of protecting the public. In light of the possibility that the
amount of damage will exceed the amount of compensation paid to
accident victims, the Act should be amended to provide for full
liability. If nuclear power is indeed as safe as the NRC and the
nuclear industry claim, then there is no reason to protect the nu-
clear industry from full liability. The fact that Congress is not will-
ing to provide for full liability indicates that it is not confident in
government and industry safety statistics. Congress' failure to
amend the Act, in turn, supports the conclusion that nuclear power
needs to be protected since it is inherently unsafe. This lack of
confidence in the safety of nuclear power underscores the necessity
for providing full compensation to nuclear accident victims.
It is clear that the present compensation system has subverted
one of the basic tenets of the common law-that one is responsible
for the full consequences of one's acts.17 9 By placing the burden of
loss for acts of the nuclear industry, not on the shoulders of the
industry, but on the shoulders of accident victims, the Price-An-
derson Act subsidizes nuclear industry. Because of the necessity of
guaranteeing that nuclear accident victims will be fully compen-
sated for their losses, full liability for nuclear accidents should be
borne by the owners of nuclear installations. It follows that aban-
donment of the Price-Anderson Act's limited liability subsidy
would advance the Act's purpose of providing public protection by
letting the forces of the market place determine the future of nu-
clear power.
179. Trull v. Carolina-Virginia Well Co., 264 N.C. 687, 691, 142 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1965).
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